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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DAN L. POWELL, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

Case No. 16520

ATLAS CORPORATION,

Defendant-Respondent
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves conflicting unpatented lode mining claims

in Emery County, Utah, in which each party seeks to quiet its
title.

DISPOSITION IN THE LONER COURT
The District Court, Judge Maurice Harding presiding, found
the issues in favor of Defendant-Respondent in its Memorandum

Decision, made detailed findings, and issued a decree quieting
the title of Defendant-Respondent in its mining claims against

Plaintiffs-Appellants.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Respondent seeks an affirmance of the judgment of
the trial court.

STATEMENT OF THE MATERIAL FACTS
As in Appellants' Brief, the mining claims of Respondent are
collectively referred to as ATLAS CLAIMS and the mining claims of
Appellants are collectively referred to as POWELL CLAIMS.

Respond-

ent also uses the same designation of the various groups of ATLAS
CLAIMS as do Appellants, namely GRAMLICH CLAIMS, WAREHAM CLAIMS,
HIHOPE CLAIMS and TAHAWAS CLAIMS.
Brief).

(See page 3 of Appellants'

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.

Machine-generated
OCR, may
contain
errors.
Respondent agrees with
the facts
(as
distinguished
from the
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argument) contained in the Statement of Facts on pages 2-5 of
Appellants' Brief, except in the following particulars:
1.

Respondent disagrees with the argument and conclusions

set forth on pages 2 and 5 to the effect that the land was subject
to relocation at time Appellants located their claims.
2.

Respondent disagrees with the argument and conclusion on

page 2 that the HIHOPE CLAIMS of Respondent are invalid.
3.

There are actually 56 WAREHAM CLAIMS rather than 54 as

stated on page 2.

The two WAREHAM CLAIMS located in February of

1961 and shown on Exhibit 76 were omitted.
4.

Exhibit 78, rather than Exhibit 68 as stated on page 3,

shows the location of TAHAWAS CLAIMS.
5.

The conveyances to Petro-Nuclear, Ltd., in 1967,

referr~

to on page 3, did not include TAHAWAS CLAIMS which were located
by Petro-Nuclear, Ltd., in March, 1968.
6.

(Exhibits 72 and 78).

The lease to Continental Oil Company referred to on page

4 was granted by Petro-Nuclear, Ltd.

(then the owner of the

property) on September 26, 1972, and was confirmed by Silver Bell
Industries, Inc.

(then the owner) on February 12, 1973.

(Exhibits

57 and 72).
Respondent contends that the Statement of Facts in Appellants'
Brief does not contain all the material facts.

The following

facts, generally set forth in chronological order, also appear
from the record:
GRAMLICH CLAIMS are divided into four sub-groups, according
to the date of location, with the names of the claims in each
sub-group as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Original Gramlich
Group (Located in August, 1945 as set
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

forth in Exhibit 56)
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Wedding Bell, San Rafael, Desert Moon, Desert Moon 1,
Desert Moon 2, Desert Moon 3, Soup Thiessen, Don, Chester, Katy,
August, Philip Fredrick, Peggy, Johnny Boy, Atomic Bomb, Betty A,
Desert Rat, Hirohito's Downfall, Honey Moon, Little Mike, Marjory
Ann, and Reefer.
1950 Gramlich Group (Located in April and May, 1950, as set
forth in Exhibit 56)
Desert Moon 4, Desert Moon 5, Desert Moon 6, Johnny Boy 1,
and Vanura.
1951 Gramlich Group (Located in March, 1951 as set forth in
bhibits 31 and 32)
Katy 1, Katy 2, August 1, August 2, Johnny Boy 2, Johnny Boy
3, Johnny Boy 4, Vanura 1, Vanura 2, and Vanura 3.

1953 Gramlich Group (Located in May, 1953 as set forth in
Exhibit 55)
Vanura 4, Vanura 5, Vanura 6, Vanura 7 and Vanura 8.
Because repeated reference is made to various maps in the
record, an explanation of some of those maps is helpful.
The Trial Court found that Exhibits 41, 42 and 43 "accurately portray the location on the ground and dimensions" of ATLAS
CLAI!1S.

(Memorandum Decision dated February 22, 1978; Finding of

Fact No. 16 in Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated May

18, 1979).

These exhibits, on a scale of 1 inch equals 200 feet,

were prepared by Charles Howard Skipper, Sr., from a survey made
by his firm, Skipper Resources, Incorporated, between October,

1977 and the trial of this case.
8

ages 6 3-7 4) .

(Transcript of March 21, 1978,

Charles Howard Skipper, Sr. , and Skipper Resources,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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'TLAs CLAIMS,

as shown on Exhibit 41 (covering claims in Southwest
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area), Exhibit 42 (covering claims in North area), and Exhibit 43
(covering claims in Southeast area) are shown on Exhibit 47, a
composite map prepared by SKIPPER on a scale of 1 inch equals 600
feet.

(Transcript of March 21, 1978, pages 66-67).

Exhibit 32

is a map, prepared by SKIPPER, of some of GRAMLICH CLAH1S as
shown on Exhibit 47.

(Transcript of March 21, 1978, page 75).

Exhibits 48, 49 and 50 are transparencies showing POWELL CLAIMS
on the same scale as Exhibit 47, which overlay Exhibit 47 and
better demonstrate the conflict between ATLAS CLAIMS and POWELL
CLAIMS than will Exhibits 1 and 3.
1978, pages 76-78).

(Transcript of Harch 21,

Exhibit 71 is a map which shows some of the

mine workings (which are identified by number) and drilling on
ATLAS CLAIMS with reference to the claim boundaries (which are
shown essentially as they are on Exhibits 41, 42, 43 and 47) and
to which reference was made by several of the witnesses as hereinafter set forth.
In March, 1951, J. W. Gramlich, the locator of GRAMLICH
CLAIMS and Otho Hurphy, while surveying Original Gramlich Group
and 1950 Gramlich Group, found some of the original monuments,
rebuilt those which had been destroyed or could not be found, and
posted and recorded amended notices of location.

(Exhibit 56;

Transcript of March 21, 1978, pages 4, 5, 9, 10, 13, 22; Exhibit
31).

A~ the same time,

they located 1951 Gramlich Group.

(Transcript of March 21, 1978, pages 5-6, 16, 18, 24, 25; Exhibit
31) ·

In describing this work, Mr. !lurphy recognized Exhibit 32

as a map of GRAMLICH CLAIMS.
pages 7, 15).

(Transcript of March 21, 1978,

The amended notices on Original Gramlich Group and

by the S.J. Quinney
Law and
Library. the
Funding original
for digitization provided
by the Instituteon
of Museum
and Library
Services
1950 Sponsored
Gramlich
Group
notices
1951
Gramlich
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Group, prepared by Mr. Gramlich and Mr. Murphy, in addition to
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describing the claims with reference to a section corner, show
the relationship of each claim in the group to another claim or
claims.

(Exhibit 31).

Samuel R. McDougall, in 1949, in 1952, and from November,
1953 until July 1957, worked and mined GRAMLICH CLAIMS, which
work and mining he described in detail with reference to particular claims and which he recognized as being located as shown on
Exhibits 4 7 and 71.

(Transcript of April 26, 1978, pages 8-26).

Phil Gramlich and his brother, John Gramlich, drilled and
mined, in 1952, on particular GRAMLICH CLAIMS as shown on Exhibit
71.

(Transcript of April 26, 1978, pages 34-44).
In 1953, Melvin Carlson, a mining engineer, made a thorough

inspection, using a map, of Original Gramlich Group, 1950 Gramlich
Group and 1951 Gramlich Group.
pages 120-123).

(Transcript of March 21, 1978,

He "verified that a goodly portion of the monu-

ments were there" and that "most of the monuments were stone,
with a large, long stone in the center surrounded by other
stones."

(Transcript of March 21, 1978, page 123).

In May, 1953, J.
C~lson,

w.

Gramlich, with the assistance of Mr.

located 1953 Gramlich Group so that the West line of

IJanura 4, 5, 6 and 7, on the ground, was common with the East
line of the earlier Vanura, Vanura 1, Vanura 2 and Vanura 3.
(Transcript of March 21, 1978, pages 124, 125, 127-129; Exhibit
47; Exhibit 55).

In 1954, Mr. Carlson moved the corners on the

:ast line of Vanura 6 and 7 (which includes the Southeast corner
of Vanura 5)

East up to 50 feet so they were exactly 1, 200 feet

2ast of Original Gramlich Group (Betty A, et al.)

from which Hr.

:arlson Sponsored
beganby thehis
survey
inFunding
locating
Gramlich
Group,
and
S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
for digitization1953
provided by
the Institute of Museum
and Library
Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.

Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~os~:ed and recorded amended
notices correcting the bearing in the
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description of those claims.
pages 126-129; Exhibit 55).

(Transcript of Barch 21, 1978,
Mr. Carlson observed that the monu-

ments on all GRAMLICH CLAIMS were in place up to the time he
stopped working on the property in April, 1955.

(Transcript of

March 21, 1978, pages 126, 127).
Frank Hovis, who worked on GRAMLICH CLAIMS from April or
May, 1954 to January, 1964, for Four Corners Uranium Corporation,
whose name was later changed to Four Corners Oil & Minerals
Company (hereinafter referred to as FOUR CORNERS), described
extensive drilling and mining operations on particular claims and
the existence of the monuments, making reference to Exhibits 47
and 71 and Exhibits 94, 95 and 96; the latter three exhibits
being sectionalized maps of GRAMLICH CLAIMS showing, on a larger
scale, mine workings and drill hole locations as on Exhibit 71.
(Transcript of March 22, 1978, pages 53, 54, 67-77; Transcript of
April 26, 1978, pages 45-74).

In 1954 and in 1956 or 1957, the

monuments were all in place and were readily identifiable because
they were "Gramlich monuments," which were "either a triangular
rock or a rectangular rock up in the center of another pile of
rocks."

(Transcript of March 22, 1978, pages 70-72; Transcript

of April 26, 1978, pages 50,51).
Roger Head, a surveyor employed by FOUR CORNERS on GRAMLICH
CLAIMS from the fall of 1960 through 1962, observed the monuments
and reestablished any that were knocked down at that time, was
acquainted with the various mines by the designated numbers, and
recognized at the trial the claims as shown on Exhibit 47.
(Transcript of March 22, 1978, pages 52-60.

See Exhibits 71, 94-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
96).
In February,
1961, Mr. Head located HIHOPE CLAIMS which
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

were surveyed and described with reference to GRAMLICH CLAH1S ·
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(Transcript of March 22, 1978, pages 55-58, 62-64; Exhibit 69).
James A. Vaughn, an employee of Respondent, then the lessee
from Petro-Nuclear, Ltd.

(hereinafter referred to as PETRO-

NUCLEAR), then the owner, described drilling and mining on particular claims and mines on ATLAS CLAIMS as shown on Exhibit 71,
between September 1, 1967 and September 1, 1968.

(Transcript of

March 22 pages 90-95; Transcript of March 23, 1978, pages 16, 19,
20; Exhibits 70 and 72).
on October 2, 1968.

The lease of Respondent was terminated

(Exhibit 90).

In 1968 and 1969, Orville
C~IMS

w.

Brammier surveyed GRAMLICH

and WAREHAM CLAIMS for PETRO-NUCLEAR, which work he de-

scribed with reference to Exhibit 47.
1978, pages 2-5, 10, 11, 13, 14).

(Transcript of March 23,

He found the existing menu-

ments, constructed new green steel monuments, and located, for
PETRO-NUCLEAR, TAHAWAS CLAIMS to fill small gaps between certain
GRAMLICH CLAIHS and which TAHAWAS CLAIMS were described with
reference to GRAMLICH CLAIMS.
p~es

(Transcript of March 23, 1978,

3-15; Exhibit 78).
In July, 1972, Dwight Crossland, a mining engineer, inspected

ATLAS CLAIMS, found the green corners erected by Mr. Brammier and
used them, with a map, to locate the various mines.

(Transcript

of March 22, 1978, pages 100-102).
In February and March, 1973, Continental Oil Company (hereinafter referred to as CONOCO) , the lessee under PETRO-NUCLEAR,
drilled 22 holes on ATLAS CLAIMS, having an average depth of 900
feet, a total depth of 19,260 feet and a total cost of $32,609.42.
(Exhibit 57; Transcript of March 21, 1978, pages 142-144; ~ran
by the S.J.
Quinney
Law Library.
Funding for
digitization
provided by
the Institute
of Museum
and Library Services
script ofSponsored
Harch
22,
1978,
pages
2-5,
8-16,
44,
46-51;
Exhibits

i9-64).

Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In October and November, 1973, CONOCO drilled 59 holes
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on ATLAS CLAIMS, having an average depth of about 450 feet, a
total depth of 25,923 feet, and a total cost of $34,223.00.
(Transcript of March 22, 1978, pages 16-29, 25-27, 31-42; Exhibits 65-67).

The location of this drilling is shown on Exhibit

58, which includes an outline of ATLAS CLAIMS, with the holes
drilled in February and March marked in green and the holes
drilled in October and November marked in red.

(Transcript of

March 22, 1978, pages 2, 6-9, 16, 22, 27-32, 39, 40).

Ray

Kozus~.

CONOCO's project geologist, testified that the drilling by CONOCO
contributed to a geologic evaluation of the "entire claim block"
(ATLAS CLAIMS).

38.

(Transcript of March 22, 1978, pages 28-32, 37,

See pages 43, 44 of this Brief).
From January through May, 1974, Appellants located 45 claims

named as follows:

Marion 7-10, Gamma 9-12, Alpha 1, Alpha R,

Alpha U, Mac 5-10, Apex 1, Ace 1-10, Yellow Sands 0, Yellow Sands

1-12, and Ridge 1-4, which conflict with the following ATLAS
CLAIMS (33 in number), to-wit:

Wedding Bell, San Rafael, Tahawas

3, Betty A, Little Mike, Soup Theissen, Don, Desert Moon 2 and 4,
Chester, Katy, Katy 1 and 2, Philip Fredrick, August, August

1 and 2, Peggy, Johnny Boy, Johnny Boy 1-4, Ajax 22, and Hihope
1-9.

(Exhibits 1, 3, 5-16, 47, 48 and 50).
CONOCO released its lease in January, 1975, but in December,

1974, Respondent, while investigating ATLAS CLAIMS, did 3,295
feet of drilling on Vanura 4, Vanura 5 and Vanura 8 claims at a
cost of $5,766.25.

(Exhibit 91; Transcript of March 22, 1978,

pages 83-85; 102-103; Transcript of March 23, 1978, pages 38-47,

51; Exhibits 74 and 80).
All the drilling done by CONOCO and Respondent penetrated

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(Transcript of March 22, 1978, pages 5, 6, 11, 12, 16-20, 26, 27,
30-38, 40-42; Transcript of ~larch 23, 1978, pages 40-45, 47-51;

Exhibit 6 8) .
In January, June and July, 1975, Appellants located 13
claims named as follows:

Yellow Sands A, B, C, D, E, and F, Hac

1-4, Bridge 3 and 4, Bridge Fraction, which conflict with the
following ATLAS CLAIHS (17 in number), to-wit:

Little Hike, Don,

Johnny Boy 2 and 3, Hihope 1 and 6-8, Soup Thiessen, Desert Hoon
1-6, and Ajax 22 and 23.

(Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 16-19, 47-50).

On March 3, 1975, Respondent acquired ownership of ATLAS
CLAIHS, and between that date and September 1, 1975, mined at a
cost of $14.00 per ton, 1,905 tons of material, making a total
reasonable cost of $26,670.00, from the area of Hine No. 9 (Vanura
2, 3, 6 and 7), Mine No. 11 (Katy 1 and Johnny Boy 1), and Mine

No. 2 (Vanura 4 and 8), in addition to ore mined and shipped from
the >'ledding Bell claim.

(Transcript of March 22, 1978, pages 83-

85, 104, 105; Transcript of March 23, 1978, pages 23-30, 35, 36,
57, 58, 62, 65; Exhibits 71, 72 and 74).
Affidavits were recorded with reference to the above described
IVork by CONOCO and Respondent for the assessment years ending
September 1 in 1973, 1974 and 1975.

(Exhibit 77).

Albert E.

Dearth, the President of Atlas Minerals, a division of Respondent,
and a qualified geologist familiar with the area, testified that

the drilling and mining done by CONOCO and Respondent benefitted
and contributed to the development and extraction of uranium ores

from the entire group of ATLAS CLAH1S, that there "is ore and
~lneralization

all over the area," that there are trends, traces,
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(Transcript of March 23, 1978, pages 67-73, 80, 85.

See also

Transcript of April 26, 1978, pages 76, 77; this Brief, pages 4446).
The Trial Court found that for each of the critical periods
the required assessment work was done and that the work benefitted
each of ATLAS CLAIMS.

(Findings of Fact Nos. 17, 18 and 19 in

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated May 18, 1979.)
on September 1, 1975, Appellants located Yellow Sands 13
which conflicts with the following ATLAS CLAIMS, to-wit:
7 and 8.

Hihope

(Exhibits 20, 47 and 48).

In the summer of 1977, William Francis Price, acting for Respondent, surveyed some of the lines of ATLAS CLAIMS as indicated
on Exhibit 41, found all of the monuments or evidence thereof
along the entire line, with the exception of two or three points,
and constructed new two by two monuments.

(Transcript of March

21, 1978, pages 131-140).
Exhibits 41, 42 and 43 show where monuments were found by
SKIPPER, some of which were described as "a sharp rock protruding
out of the center" or as a "stone turned on in (end) sitting ... in
rocks around them"

(See earlier reference in this Brief on pages

5 and 6 to "Gramlich monuments").

(Transcript of March 21, 1978,

pages 63, 65, 67, 72, 74-75, 113, 114).

SKIPPER found evidence

of earlier surveys and some of the green steel posts.

a

v

(Transcript

of March 21,1978, pages 67, 85, 86, 114).
ARGUMENT
ANSWER TO APPELLANTS' POINT I--THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
CONCLUDING THAT GRAMLICH CLAIMS ARE NOT INVALID BECAUSE OF ALLEGED
DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THEIR LOCATION ON THE GROUND AND THE DESCRIPTIONS
IN THE AJ1ENDED AND ORIGINAL NOTICES OF LOCATION MADE
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Appellants' Argument I can be separated into two contentions:
First, that the land covered by some of GRAMLICH CLAIMS does not
conform to the descriptions contained in the amended and original
notices made in 1951, thereby invalidating the claims; and second,
that those same GRAMLICH CLAIMS have been "shifted", "walked" or
moved from their place of original location so that the Respondent
cannot claim the land presently covered.
The statute which governs is 30 u.s.c.A., § 28, the pertinent
part of which reads as follows:
..•• All records of mining claims •.. shall contain ••• such a
description of the claim or claims located by reference
to some natural object or permanent monument as will
identify the claim ••.•
Respondent concedes that some of the amended notices on
Original Gramlich Group and 1950 Gramlich Group and the original
notices on 1951 Gramlich Group are not perfectly accurate in
describing the location of the claim with reference to the section
corner mentioned in the notices.

The discrepancy lies in the

general bearing of the group of claims.

The claims are described

as running North, when their actual bearing on the ground is about
North 17° East; so that while there is little discrepancy on the
South portion of the claims (where the major conflict area is) ,
as the distance increases from the original tie-in point the
variance increases.

(See Exhibits 41, 42, 43 and 87).

The notices, which are contained in Exhibit 31, describe
each claim with reference to other claims in the group so that if
one claim is found either on the ground or in the records it
~uld

not be difficult to find the balance of the claims because

of their stated relationship to each other.
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the issu~ of the sufficiency of the description with reference to
a natural object or permanent monument which show that considerable
latitude is allowed and that strict, technical compliance is not
required; that a reference to another mining claim is sufficient;
that a description is sufficient if, under all the facts and
circumstances, it fixes the general locality of the claim; that a
variation between the boundaries of a claim as marked on the
ground, and the description in the notice, will not, by itself,
invalidate the claim; and that the sufficiency of the description
is a question of fact.

Russell v. Chumasero, 4 Mont. 309, 1 Pac.

713 (1882); Upton v. Larkin, 7 Mont. 449, 17 Pac. 728 (1888);
Garner v. Glenn, 8 Mont. 371, 20 Pac. 654
10 Utah 266, 37 Pac. 480

(1889); Hanson v. Fletcher,

(1894); Riste v. Horton, 20 Mont. 139,

49 Pac. 656 (1897); Wilson v. Triumph Consolidated Mining Co., 19
Utah 66, 56 Pac. 301 (1899); Farmington Gold Mining Co. v. Rhymney
Gold & Copper Co., 20 Utah 363, 58 Pac. 832

(1899); Wells v.

Davis, 22 Utah 322, 62 Pac. 3 (1900); Bonanza Consolidated Mining
Co. v. Golden Head Mining Co., 29 Utah 159, 80 Pac. 736 (1905);
Londonderry ~1ining Company v. United Gold Mines Co., 38 Colo.
480, 88 Pac. 455 (1907); Ninemire v. Nelson, 140 t-vash.

511, 249

Pac. 990 (1926); Cranford v. Gibbs, 123 Utah 447, 260 P.2d 870
(1953); Fuller v. Hountain Sculpture, 6 Utah 2d 385, 314 P. 2d 842
(1957).

See also 58 C.J.S., Mines and Minerals, 1948, §52, page

106; 2 Lindley on Mines, Third Edition, 1914, § 382, beginning at
page 904; Upton v. Santa Rita Mining Co., 14 N.M. 96, 89 Pac. 275
(1907).
Cranford v. Gibbs, supra, a Utah case, sustains the finding
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notices of location.
Fuller v. Mountain Sculpture, supra, another utah case, is
directly in point.

The claim was described in the notice of

location as running "due north-south" but was actually "25 degrees
west of north •.• so that if the description were applied literally
it would not include" the area "in controversy."

This court

found no basis to disturb the finding of the trial court that the
claim was where the monuments were and held that the variance did
not invalidate the claim.
In the case at hand, the Trial Court found that valid and
proper notices of location were posted and recorded which includes,
by implication,

a finding that the descriptions were sufficient.

(See Finding of Fact No. 12 in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated May 18, 1979).
"The rule of review of issues of fact is that all of the
evidence and every inference and intendment fairly arising therefrom should be taken in the light most favorable to the findings
made by the trial court."

Rummell v. Bailey, 7 Utah 2d 137, 320

P.2d 653 (1958), citing Jensen v. Logan City, 96 Utah 53, 83 P.2d

311 (1938) and Toomer's Estate v. Union Pac. R. Co., 121 Utah 37,
239 P. 2d 163

(1951).

Applying the above rule, the evidence does sustain the
finding of the Trial Court that the amended notices and original
notices made on GRAMLICH CLAIMS in 1951 were sufficient.
Appellants can hardly complain about technical defects in
the descriptions in the notices for GRAHLICH CLAIMS when the

descriptions in the notices on POIVELL CLAIMS are such that Appelby the S.J.testified
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(Transcript of March 23, 1978, page 139.)
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The primary thrust of Appellants' Argument I is that some of
GRAMLICH CLAIMS have been moved.

Finding of Fact No. 16, that

Exhibits 41, 42 and 43 accurately show the location of ATLAS
CLAIMS, includes a rejection by the Trial Court of this contention, and is a finding that the claims have not been moved.
The sole grounds asserted by Appellants to support their
argument is that a platting of some of the amended and original
notices of location made by J. W. Gramlich and Otho Murphy in
1951 does not cover exactly the same ground as that shown in
Exhibits 41, 42 and 43.
In case of a variation as to the location of a claim between
the monuments on the ground and the description in the notices,
the monuments control.

58 C.J.S., Hines and Minerals, 1948, §

52, page 106; American Mining Law, 1943, Volume I, Bulletin 123,
§ 536, page 317;

pages 904-905.

2 Lindley on Mines, Third Edition, 1914, § 382,
This is the holding of this Court in Fuller v.

Mountain Sculpture, supra.
The facts in the Statement of Material Facts show that
GRAMLICH CLAIMS actually existed on the ground from the time of
location as they are now shown on Exhibits 41, 42 and 43.
Evidence (which is only briefly referred to in the Statement of
Material Facts but is more completely indicated in the entire
record) of recognition of the claims and extensive drilling and
mining operations from the earliest days at established mines
(which could not be moved) on particular claims, all as shown on
Exhibits 47 and 71; continuity in the maintenance of the monuments
at their present location; the continued existence of some of the
Sponsored by themonuments";
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the earlier GRAMLICH CLAIMS on the grou.~d; all support the finding
of the Lower Court.

(See this Brief, pages 2-10).

Appellants' contention was made by appellants in cranford v.
~,

supra.

The Yellow Canary claims of respondents were

described in the notices as being two miles Northeast of Marysvale,
Utah "along Old County Highway."

Appellants contended that the

claims were originally located in an area designated by the Court
for convenience as Area 1, miles from the subsequent surveyed
location, known as Area 2.

Area 1 was considerably closer to the

Old County Highway (referred to in the notices of location) than
Area 2.
After summarizing the conflicting testimony, the Utah Supreme
Court said:
We have generalized the principal testimony only to
point out that a finding as to the original location
of the Yellow Canary claims is dependent upon the
credibility of the witnesses.
The trial court,
having heard and observed the witnesses and after
visiting the actual lands involved, resolved the
issues in favor of the respondents and against the
appellants. We are not inclined to disturb his
findings.
The same can be said here, and under the rule of review in
Rummell v. Bailey, supra, there is clearly evidence to support
the finding of the Trial Court that GRAMLICH CLAIMS have not been
"shifted", "walked" or otherwise moved.
ANSWER TO APPELLANTS' POINT II--THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR

IN FINDING THAT DESERT RAT CLAIMS AND SAND VALLEY CLAIMS WERE NOT
VALIDLY LOCATED AND THAT IF IT IS ASSUMED THAT SAID CLAIMS "IVERE
VALIDLY LOCATED, THE ASSESSMENT WORK HAD NOT BEEN DONE AND THE
LANDS WERE OPEN TO LOCATION "IVHEN HIHOPE CLAIMS OF RESPONDENT WERE
LOCATED.
Appellants assert that the land covered by HIHOPE CLAIMS
!located in February, 1961) was validly appropriated by prior

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and Sand Valley and Sand Valley 1-6 (hereinafter referred to as
SAND VALLEY CLAIMS) and was not open to location in February,
1961.
In analyzing the evidence regarding DESERT RAT CLAIMS and
SAND VALLEY CLAIMS it should be remembered that Appellants do not
claim under those alleged locations, but rather assert them in an
effort to defeat HIHOPE CLAIMS of Respondent which were located
many years prior to POWELL CLAIMS.

From Columbia Standard Corp.

v. Ranchers Exploration and Development, Inc., lOth Cir., 468
F.2d 547 (1972), citing Ranchers Exploration & Development Co. v.

Anaconda Co., D. Ut., 248 F. Supp. 708 (1965), we read the followir.:
There is an absence of good faith where the junior
locator seeks possession solely on the basis of
defects in the senior locator's claims.
The Trial Court found that the boundaries of DESERT RAT
CLAIMS and SAND VALLEY CLAIMS were not distinctly marked on the
ground so the same can be readily traced and that discovery
monuments were not erected and notices of location posted thereon
for DESERT RAT CLAIMS and SAND VALLEY CLAIMS other than Desert
Rat 3, Sand Valley, and Sand Valley 2 and 5.

(Finding of Fact

No. 5 in Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated May 18,
1979.

See 30 U.S.C.A. § 28; § 40-1-3, Utah Code Annotated,

19 53).
While it is true that Roger Fluckey testified that he
erected corner monuments and a discovery monument at which a
notice was placed on Desert Rat 3 and that he followed "the same
procedure in staking Desert Rat 2," Appellants' Surveyor knew
nothing of this claim and no map of Desert Rat 2 prepared by a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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March 23, pages 92, 93, 117, 118).

The only evidence as to the
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location of Desert Rat 2 was a free hand drawing of its "approximate" location by Mr. Fluckey on Exhibit 85.

(Transcript of

March 23, 1979, pages 104-106, 109, 110).
Appellants attempt to remedy this uncertainty by making
reference to an amended notice of location.
pages 11, 12; Exhibit 82).

(Appellants' Brief,

SKIPPER prepared Exhibit 99 which

overlays Exhibit 47 showing, among other things, Desert Rat 2 as
shown on Exhibit 85, and Exhibit 100 which is also an overlay on
Exhibit 47 showing Desert Rat 2 from the description in the
amended notice.

(Transcript of April 26, 1978, pages 79-86.)

These exhibits show that the amended notice describes the claim
in a different place than where Mr. Fluckey drew it.
With reference to SAND VALLEY CLAIMS, the only evidence of
the erection of the monuments marking the boundaries and their
actual location on the ground is the testimony of Hr. Fluckey
that when locating DESERT RAT CLAIMS he was familiar with the
boundaries of SAND VALLEY CLAIMS.
page 90).

Mr.

(Transcript of Harch 23, 1978,

Fluckey did not point out the location of the SAND

VMLEY CLAIMS monuments to Appellants' surveyors, who admitted
that they found no corner monuments and that the positions of
SAND VALLEY CLAIMS on Exhibit 85 were "pieced together" from the

discovery monuments found for Sand Valley, Sand Valley 2 and Sand
Valley 5, using the amended notices of location in Exhibit 86.
(Transcript of March 23, 1978, pages 104, 112-122; Transcript of
April 26, 1978, pages 90-95).

The uncertainty of this approach

in determining the position of SAND VALLEY CLAIMS is illustrated
by the fact that a platting of SAND VALLEY CLAIMS from the amended
by the discovery
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than·does Exhibit 85.

(Exhibits 47, 99 and 100; Transcript of

April 26, 1978, pages 79-86).
The only evidence of the erection of discovery monuments on
SAND VALLEY CLAIMS is the testimony of Arther Duane Wise, one of
Appellant's surveyors, that he and his crew found the discovery
monument of Sand Valley with an amended notice of location in it
and the discovery monuments of Sand Valley 2 and Sand Valley 5
with papers in them.

(Transcript of March 23, 1978, pages 112-

119; Transcript of April 26, 1978, pages 90-91, 94-95.

See § 40-

1-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953).
The actual language in Dagget v. Yreka Min. & Mil. Co., 149
Cal. 357, 86 Pac. 968 (1906), cited on page 14 of Appellants'
Brief, is as follows:
The only competent evidence of the marking of
boundaries is that of witnesses who saw the monuments placed, or who saw them standing after being
placed.
and is not inconsistent with, but rather supports the position of
Respondent.
Respondent submits that the burden was on Appellants to
show, not only that the proper acts of location were accomplished
on DESERT RAT CLAIMS and SAND VALLEY CLAIMS, but also where the
claims were actually located on the ground with sufficient accuracy that the boundaries can be determined without speculation.
Appellants did not sustain that burden.
The Trial Court found that the discovery monument for Desert
Rat 3 was located on Desert Moon 1, a prior valid claim which is
part of ATLAS CLAIMS, and that the discovery monument of Sand
Valley
ifQuinney
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and 8 in Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated May 18,
1979) .
A mining claim having its discovery monument on a prior
valid claim is void.

Watson v. Mayberry, 15 Utah 265, 49 Pac.

479 (1897); Reynolds v. Pascoe, 24 Utah 219, 66 Pac. 1065 (1901);

Lockhart v. Farrell, 31 Utah 155, 86 Pac. 1077 (1906).

See also

Fox v. Myers, 29 Nev. 169, 86 Pac. 793 (1906); Cram v. Church, 9
Utah 2d 169, 340 P. 2d 1116 (1959).
The evidence (which is not challenged by Appellants) shows
that Desert Moon 1 and 5 were located prior to Desert Rat 3 and
Sand Valley 6 and that the assessment work was done on Desert
t1oon 1 and 5 for the assessment years pertinent to the dates of
the alleged location and amended location of Desert Rat 3 and
Sand Valley 6.

(See Exhibits 56, 71, 81-82, 86, 88 and 92-97;

Transcript of April 26, 1978, pages 9, 11-23, 27, 28, 33-41, 4575) •

Appellants do not attack the finding of the Trial Court that
the discovery monument of Sand Valley 6 was on Desert Moon 5, but
do contend that the evidence does not show that the discovery
monument of Desert Rat 3 is on Desert Moon 1.

(Appellant's

Brief, page 11).
The evidence sustains the finding of the Lower Court in both
instances.

Exhibit 85 was identified and offered by Appellants.

(Transcript of March 23, 1978, pages 117, 118).
Exhibit 1

It is a copy of

(also Appellants' Exhibit) insofar as it shows the

location of ATLAS CLAIMS and POWELL CLAIMS.
aries of Desert Moon 1 and 5.

It shows the bound-

Roger Fluckey (called by Appellants)
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Q
(By Mr. Frandsen)
Will you come forward
here and examine Plaintiffs' Exhibit 85, and will
you stand over here and point out where this Desert
Rat 3 is?
A

Desert Rat 3, right here.
(Witness indicating.)

Q
Now, are you still pointing there to a
claim that is labeled Desert Rat 3 and is circled
in purple and is hatched with red lines?
A

Yes.

Q
All right now, where does that fit in
in relation to the Atlas claims?
A

These are the Atlas claims on the west.
(Witness indicating.)

Q
Mr. Fluckey, with reference to Desert
Rat 3, where is the discovery monument?
A

To the north end.

Q
Would you come and indicate it on the
map? Let's see, what color did we use? Green.
Let's have the green.
Would you point out the
discovery monument on Desert Rat 3, and would
you writ (sic) the words D.M. for discovery
monument?
A

('lvitness complied.)

An examination of Exhibit 85 shows the green "D.M." to be
well within the boundaries of Desert Moon 1.
demonstrated by overlaying Exhibit 99

This is further

(the transparency showing

DESERT RAT CLAIMS and SAND VALLEY CLAIMS) on Exhibit 47.

(See

Transcript of April 26, 1978, pages 79-86).
Even though Appellants do not question the finding with
reference to Sand Valley 6 and even though there is no evidence
of the erection or existence of the discovery monument on that
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The Trial Court found that the assessment work was not done
on DESERT RAT CLAIMS and SAND VALLEY CLAIMS for the assessment
year ending September 1, 1960 and the period between September 1,
1960 and the 20th day of February, 1961, when Hihope 9, the last
of HIHOPE CLAIMS was located.

(Finding of Fact No. 9 in Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated May 18, 1979).

Appellants

do not challenge the finding with reference to the latter period.
Appellants' offered proof of assessment work done on DESERT
AAT CLAIMS for the assessment year ending September 1, 1960 in
the form of testimony of Roger Fluckey, the locator, on direct
examination, that one hole was drilled on Desert Rat 2 and one
hole on Desert Rat 3, that he guessed each hole was between 80 to

100 feet deep and that he remeffiPered that the average cost of
drilling was $0.85 to $1.25 a foot.
1978, pages 98, 99).

(Transcript of Harch 23,

On cross examination he said that he couldn't

remember but the depth was around 80 feet.
23, 1978, page 110.)

(Transcript of March

On redirect the witness said he was "making

a wild guess" on direct and cross, that he was guessing and did
not know exactly, and that 80 feet would be the minimum and 150
feet the maximum depth of each hole.

(Transcript of March 23,

1978, pages llO-lll.)

No other assessment work was claimed as is evidenced by the
fact that an Affidavit of Labor and Improvement was executed and
recorded by Mr. Fluckey for five claims (including DESERT RAT
2LAH1S)

and the two drill holes described above were the entire

issessment work claimed for the claims listed in the affidavit.
(Exhibit 84; Transcript of r1arch 23, 1978, page 110).
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and McCulloch v. Murphy, Cir.Ct., D.Nev., 125 Fed. 147 (1903),
cited on page 13 of Appellants' Brief with reference to the
alleged assessment work on DESERT RAT CLAIMS, as applied to those
cases which involved a contest (unlike the particular issue
involved here) between prior and subsequent conflicting locators
in which the latter claimed the former had not done the required
work.

Appellants also correctly cite the statutory requirement

in 30 U.S.C.A. § 28 on page 12 of their brief that $100.00 worth
of labor is required for each claim during annual assessment
periods now ending on September 1.

However, the proof that work

having the required value was not done on DESERT RAT CLAIMS is
clear and convincing.

If the minimum figures given by Mr. Fluckey

(80 feet per hole and a price of $0.85 per foot) are accepted,
there is only $68.00 "worth of labor" for each claim.
There are two principles which defeat Appellants' contention
regarding the assessment work on DESERT RAT CLAIMS that the
median of the figures on the depth of the holes and price per
foot should be used.

(See page 13 of Appellants' Brief).

First

is the holding of Alvarado v. Tucker, 2 Utah 2d 16, 268 P.2d 986
(1954), that testimony on cross examination that defendant was
going anywhere from 25 to 30 miles per hour is not evidence that
defendant was traveling faster than 25 miles per hour.

Applying

this rule, the testimony of Mr. Fluckey is only evidence that
$68.00 worth of labor was performed on each of DESERT RAT CLAIMS.
Second is the rule of review in Rummell v. Bailey, supra.

Viewing

the testimony of Mr. Fluckey in the light most favorable to the
finding of the Trial Court only the minimum depth and value can
be Sponsored
considered.
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form of drilling was done on SAND VALLEY CLAIMS for the assess-

ment year ending September 1, 1960 with the testimony of Mr.
warren Thurston.

(Appellants' Brief, page 15).

Appellants, in

their Brief, do not claim any mining as assessment work and, at
the trial, did not offer any proof in that regard.
The following from the Transcript of April 26, 1978, establishes that Mr. Thurston's testimony is ineffective in showing
that sufficient drilling was done to satisfy the requirement of
30 u.s.c.A., § 28, to-wit:

Q
Did you do drilling for the Welch
Hining Company?

y

A

Yes, I did.

Q

Did you do drilling during 1960 and

1961?
A
Nell, I couldn't exactly tell you the
years that I done the drilling and the actual
years that I was working in the mine.
(Page 98, Lines 8-12.)
Q
Calling your attention to the year 1960,
did you do drilling in this area where this reservoir is in the Wayne Smith corral for Welch?

A

Yes, I did, as near as I can recollect.

Q

Do you know how much drilling you did?

A

No.

(Page 102, Lines 10-15.)
The Trial Court was justified in finding that the required
mrk was not done.
Appellants assert, on page 15 of their Brief, that Exhibit
89, the recorded affidavit with reference to SAND VALLEY CLAIMS,
~d

others, "supports the testimony of Mr. Thurston."

Respondent
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Further, the Trial Court found that the recorded affidavits
on DESERT RAT CLAIMS and SAND VALLEY CLAIMS (Exhibits 84 and 89)
do not show the following required by § 40-1-6, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, to-wit:
A.

The number of days' work done.

B.
The character and value of the improvements
placed on the claims.

c.

The number of cubic feet of earth or rock
removed.

D.
The actual amount paid for the labor and improvements and by whom paid.
E.
That notices were posted as required by §
40-1-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
and concluded that Exhibits 84 and 89 are not prima facie evidence
that the work was done.

(Finding of Fact No. 10 and Conclusion

of Law No. 3 in Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated Hay
18, 1979).
Brief.

This finding is not challenged by Appellants in their

(See Upton v. Santa Rita Mining Co., supra; McKnight v.

El Paso Brick Co., 16 N.M. 721, 120 Pac. 694 (1911).
Under the now familiar rule of review in Rummell v. Bailey,
supra, there is no basis to reverse the finding of the Lower
Court that when ATLAS CLAIMS were located, the land was open to
location.

(Finding of Fact No. 4 in Findings of Fact and Conclu-

sions of Law dated May 18, 1979).
ANSWER TO APPELLANTS' POINT III--THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR
IN FINDING THAT THE REQUIRED ASSESSMENT WORK WAS DONE ON ATLAS
CLAIMS SO AS TO PRECLUDE THE RELOCATION OF THE SAME BY APPELLANTS.
Appellants concede, on appeal, that the assessment work was
done on ATLAS CLAIMS for all the critical periods except the
years ending on September 1, in 1973, 1974 and 1975.

(Appellants'
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questioned years was greatly in excess of $11,400.00 ($100.00 for
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each of 114 claims) and Appellants admit that the amount was
sufficient.

46).

(This Brief, pages 7-10; Appellants' Brief, page

However, Appellants contend that the actual work was not

done during those critical years on the particular ATLAS CLAIMS
which Appellants sought to relocate and that the work done on
oilier ATLAS CLAIMS did not benefit, so as to qualify as assessment work, the particular claims in conflict.
Exhibit 47 shows (and Appellants do not dispute) that ATLAS
CLAIMS are one contiguous group.
The statements on page 27 of Appellants' Brief that the
drilling represented by green dots on Exhibit 58 extended approximately 2 miles is not accurate.
s~e

The scale on Exhibit 58 is the

as on Exhibit 47, 1 inch equals 600 feet.

A simple measure-

ment on Exhibit 58 shows that each line of green dots is about
7,500 feet.

Pages 28-31, 41, and 42 of Appellants' Brief list

alleged distances between the work done on ATLAS CLAIMS and
POWELL CLAIMS.

Respondent submits that the distance between the

place of the work on ATLAS CLAIMS and POWELL CLAIMS is totally
irrelevant.

The distance between the place where the work was

done on ATLAS CLAIMS and the particular ATLAS CLAIMS which Appellants sought to relocate may have some relevance.

Assuming that

this is what Appellants are trying to show, Respondent submits
that while precise mathematical measurement of distances is not
critical to a determination of the issues, Appellants' Brief does
not accurately state the distances.

One example will suffice.

Page 28 of Appellants' Brief asserts that the closest hole drilled
~ CONOCO in February and March, 1973 is one mile from the nearest
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sought to be relocated by Appellants).

(See this Brief, page 8).

The drilling done by CONOCO for the assessment year ending
September 1, 1974 was performed in October and November, 1973,
prior to the location of any POWELL CLAIMS (the first of which
was located in January, 1974) which Appellants now assert to be
valid.
Brief).

(See pages 7-8 of this Brief and page 29 of Appellants'
This, even if the work was not done in the prior assess-

ment year,

(and it was in fact done), the work in October and

November, 1973 amounted to a resumption of the work on ATLAS
CLAIMS which would preclude the relocation of the same by POWELL
CLAIMS.

Belk v. Meagher, 104 U.S. 279

(1881); Pharis v. Huldoon,

75 Cal. 284, 17 Pac. 70 (1888); Klopenstine v. Hays, 20 Utah 45,
57 Pac. 712 (1899); Strattan v. Raine, 45 Nev. 10, 197 Pac. 695
(1921); Herbert v. Bond, 56 S.D. 220, 228 N.W. 185 (1929); Whitwell
v. Goodsell, 37 Ariz. 451, 295 Pac. 318 (1931); Hartman Gold
Mining Co. v. Warning, 40 Ariz.

267, 11 P.2d 854 (1932); Pidgeon

v. Lamb, 133 Cal. App. 342, 24 P.2d 206 (1933); Ickes v. Virginia
Colorado Development Corporation, 295

u.s.

639, 55 S.Ct. 888, 79

L.Ed. 1627 (1934); New Mercur Mining Co. v. South Mercur Mining
Co., 101 Utah 131, 128 P.2d 269 (1942), cert. denied 319 U.S.
753, 63 S.Ct. 1162, 87 L.Ed. 1707; Knight v. Flat Top Mining Co.,
6 Utah 2d 51, 305 P.2d 503 (1957); Featherston v. Howse, D.Ark.,
151 F. Supp. 353 (1957).

Therefore, all the drilling done by

CONOCO in calendar year 1973 should be considered with reference
to POWELL CLAIMS located from January through May, 1974.
The question in this case goes to the sufficiency of the
assessment work done on ATLAS CLAIMS for the assessment years
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whether the work done on ATLAS CLAIMS was of "benefit"

(as that
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term is defined in the applicable cases) to the entire group of
claims and particularly to those claims which Appellants sought
to relocate.
The pertinent language of 30 U.S.C.A., § 28 (which has not
changed since its adoption) is as follows:
On each claim ••• , and until a patent has been issued
therefore, not less than $100 worth of labor shall be
performed or improvements made during each year ••••
Where such claims are held in common, such expenditures
may be made on any one claim.
See Chambers v. Harrington, 111 U.S. 353, 4 S. Ct. 428, 28 L'.Ed.
452 (1884).

Justice Sawyer, in Mount Diablo M. & M. Company v. Callison,
Cir. Ct., D. Nev., 5 Sawyer 439, 17 Fed. Cases, Case No. 9886
(1879),

said:

"Work done outside of the claim •.. , if done for the
purpose and as a means of prospecting or developing
the claim, ••• is as available as if done within the
boundaries of the claim itself. One general system
may be formed well adapted and intended to work several
contiguous claims ..• , and where such is the case work
in furtherance of the system is work on the claims
intended to be developed.
In Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U.S. 636, 26 L.Ed. 875 (1881)
we read the following:

Long before patents were allowed--indeed from the earliest
period in which mining for gold and silver was pursued as
a business--miners were in the habit of consolidating adjoining claims, whether they consisted of one or more original locations, into one for convenience and economy in
working them. .
Labor and improvements, within the meaning of the statute,
are deemed to have been had on a mining claim, whether
it consists of one location or several, when the labor
is performed or the improvements are made for its development, that is, to facilitate the extraction of the metals
it may contain, though in fact such labor and improvements
may be on ground which originally constituted one of the
locations,
as in sinking a shaft, or be at a distance from
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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carry off the debris or waste material.
In Jupiter Mining Co. v. Bodie Consolidated Mining Co., Cir.
Ct., D. Cal., 11 Fed. 666, 7 Sawy. 96 (1881), the instruction
given to the jury by Chief Justice Sawyer included the following:
With regard to the work required to be done in order to
hold a claim, the jury are further instructed that where
one person or company owns several contiguous or adjoining
claims capable or being advantageously worked together,
one general system may be adopted to work such claims •...
When such a system is adopted, work in furtherance of the
system is work on the claims intended to be developed by
it. Work done outside of the claims, or outside of any
claim, if done for the purpose and as a means of prospecting
or working the claim, is as available for holding the claim
as if done within the boundaries of the claim itself.
In Jackson v. Roby, 109 U.S. 440, 3 S. Ct. 301, 27 L. Ed.
990 (1883), the only assessment work claimed was that of constructing a flume from the adjoining claims which carried tailings
from the adjoining claims to the claim in question to the extent
that the tailings covered more than one-third of the claim in
question.

Justice Field, who also wrote the opinion in Smelting

Co. v. Kemp, supra, quoted the language cited above from that
case and said:
In other words, the law permits a general system to be
adopted for adjoining claims held in common, and in such
cases the expenditures required may be made, or the labor
be performed, upon any one of them.
Here no work was done for the general improvement of all
claims.
The deposit of the debris from the Lomax Gulch
(the adjoining claims) on the premises in controversy,
so far from tending to develop them, imposed obstacles
in the way of their development, by covering them up with
refuse matter.
This brings us to the leading case of Harrington v. Chambers,
3 Utah 94, 1 Pac. 362 (1882), in which the trial court adopted
findings of the referee that work on a main shaft on one claim
"with
a view
to the
future
working
andby development"
of Services
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proper assessment work.
The Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah affirmed the
decision and said, in part, as follows:
The second point urged upon our attention relates to that
portion of the fifth finding of fact, which states that
the main shaft of the Lady of the Lake is in such proximity
to said Parley's Park mining claim, that work in it has
a tendency to develop said claim.
It is claimed by the
appellants that there is no evidence to support this part
of the finding.
The testimony uncontradicted established
as a fact, as stated in the finding, that the owners of
the Parley's Park claim were also the owners of two certain
claims, called respectively the "Central" and "Lady of the
Lake," the Central adjoining the Parley's Park, and the
Lady of the Lake adjoining the Central mining claim, and
with a view to the future working and development of all
three of said claims, the owners thereof located what is
called the "main shaft" in the Lady of the Lake surface
ground.
The testimony was also uncontradicted as to the
object for which the shaft was located, and its relative
location; it was further shown upon the maps put in evidence.
It is true, no witness testified in the exact words of
the finding objected to, nor was this necessary in order to
support the finding.
The portion of the finding objected to
is a statement of the ultimate facts found by the referee
from this uncontradicted testimony, and is warranted by
the facts and circumstances in proof . • • .
The testimony in the case before us leaves no room for
doubt, and such is the express finding of the referee that
the work in question was done for the express purpose of
developing the three claims owned by the respondents, one
of which is the Parley's Park, and .•• is as available for
holding that claim as if done on the claim itself.
This case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court
(Chambers v. Harrington, supra) which affirmed, quoting with
approval the above language from Mount Diablo M.
Callison, supra, and Jackson v. Roby, supra.

&

M. Company v.

The Court also

said:
It is equally clear that in such case the claims must be
contiguous, so that each claim thus associated may in
some way be benefitted by the work done on one of them.
Book v. Justice Min. Co., Cir. Ct., D. Nev., 58 Fed. 106
!1893),
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claims.

The court held these to be sufficient and said:

When such work is done for the avowed and express purpose
of prospecting two or more claims held in common, as was
the case here, the courts have always held that such work
was to be credited to such claims.
This is always deemed
to be a sufficient compliance with the provisions of the
mining laws of the United States.
It is well to briefly summarize the development of the law
from the above cases (that is, up to and including Book v. Justice
Min. Co., supra, in 1893).
The proposition that work done on one claim can serve as
work on another was well established.

Mount Diablo M. & M.

Company v. Callison, supra (1879); Smelting Co. v. Kemp, supra
(1881); Jupiter Mining Co. v. Bodie Consolidated Mining Co.,
supra (1881); Jackson v. Roby, supra (1883); Chambers v. Harrington, supra (1884); Book v. Justice Min. Co., supra (1893).

The

1872 Mining Law and these cases were a statutory and judicial
confirmation of a practice existing among miners prior to the
adoption of the 1872 Mining Law.

Smelting Co. v. Kemp, supra;

Chambers v. Harrington, supra.
The opinion of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah in
Harrington v. Chambers, supra, affirmed a finding that the work
had "a tendency to develop" the adjoining claim and held that the
requirement is met if the work is done for the "express purpose
of developing" all the claims in the group and also held that
such might be inferred.

The United States Supreme Court in

Chambers v. Harrington, supra, in affirming the Utah decision,
stated that "the claims must be contiguous, so that each
may in some way be benefited

." and reaffirmed the state-

ments in the earlier cases to the effect that "the law permits a
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We now move to an examination of subsequent cases.

Wilson

v. Triumph Consolidated Mining Co., supra, speaks in terms of
"consolidation" of adjoining claims for "development and working
purposes", and Klopenstine v. Hays, supra, holds the work on one
claim sufficient to hold other claims without explanation.
Fissure Co. v. Old Susan Co., 22 Utah 438, 63 Pac. 587 (1900),
incorporates some of the language of the earlier cases stating
that "the claims were consolidated or worked for development
purposes", that the "work was done to apply on" all the claims,
and that the "work was of benefit to all claims."
This Court came squarely to grips with the issue of how work
on one claim had to relate to adjoining claims in order to meet
the requirements of the statute in Nevada Exploration and Mining
Co. v. Spriggs, 41 Utah 171, 124 Pac. 770 (1912).
the trial court found the work sufficient.

In that case,

The crucial facts, as

stated in the dissent of Justice Straup, are as follows:
Respondents claimed 7 or 8 claims. They did work on one
which they claim inured to and was for the benefit of all.
The work done by them on the one claim was the sinking of
a shaft about 122 feet deep, one or two short drifts, and
the running of a tunnel 114 feet long.
This work, most
of which was done after appellant's location, is claimed
inured to the benefit of the 6 or 7 other claims, tended
to develop them and to discover mineral therein, and
facilitated the extraction of ore therefrom.
It is shown
that to extend the tunnel to such claims and to the area
in conflict would require the tunnel to be extended a
distance of from 3,700 to 4,500 feet and that, when the
tunnel is so extended, a depth on such claims of only 54
feet would be attained. Hhile so-called experts testified
that in their opinion the work inured to the benefit and to
development of such claims, yet, when asked on what facts
such opinions were based, their answers, in my judgment,
disclosed none.
It is not shown that the vein on the claim
on which the work was done is the same vein on the claims
alleged to be benefited by such work.
I think what evidence
there is on the subject shows the contrary.
It is almost
inconceivable that a tunnel 3,700 or 4,500 feet through
solid
rock
be
ever
intended
beof Museum
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Sponsored
by the will
S.J. Quinney
Law or
Library.
Funding was
for digitization
provided by theto
Institute
and Library Services
to such claims Library
to Services
reach
a depth
of only
64 State
feet.
It is
and Technology
Act, administered
by the Utah
Library.
Machine-generated
OCR,
may
contain
errors.
not made to appear how the sinking of the shaft on the

Page 32
one claim tended to discover or explore mineral on the
other claims 3,000 to 4,000 feet away, or facilitated its
extraction therefrom. The physical features and relative
positions of gulches and mountains render that impractical,
if not impossible.
In spite of this, the majority of this Court affirmed,
saying:
The next proposition argued is that the court erred in
finding that respondents had done the requisite amount
of assessment work and had made the necessary amount of
improvements to entitle them to a patent for the mining
claims in dispute.
It is contended that the evidence is
insufficient to sustain such findings.
The principal
objection in this regard is that the work, which consisted of sinking a shaft and running drifts therefrom,
was not calculated either to prospect or to develop the
entire group of mining claims, or any considerable part
thereof, because the shaft in question was too far distant
from some of the claims, and because the drift, even if
run from the shaft, would not reach an appreciable depth
below the surface because the elevation of the claims was
not much above the elevation of the shaft. There is some
direct and positive evidence from expert miners and mining
engineers in the record that the shaft and the drifts as
constructed tended to develop the whole group of claims,
and that the work was also proper as prospecting work.
We think the trial court was right in not substituting
his own judgment for that of the mining men and engineers.
The courts should be very slow, indeed, in holding that
certain work is not calculated to develop certain mining
claims, or is not proper prospecting work, when there is
competent evidence that such is the effect of the work
in question, and where there is no evidence to the contrary.
The Court then cited Chambers v. Harrington, supra, and said
further:
But counsel insists that there is no proof that respondents
had in fact adopted a general system, or any system, for
the development of their claims. We think that it is not
necessary for a claimant to prepare plans and specifications
with regard to how he intends to develop his claims. The
purpose of the law is to require claimants to do such work
or to make such improvements as may be said are calculated
to prospect the claims, or that will develop the mineral in
the claims, or will facilitate the extraction of the mineral
found therein.
In many instances, if a fixed plan were
adopted in advance of exploration, it, for obvious reasons,
would have to be departed from before pursuing it many days,
and in all cases where veins were found, the strike of which
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changed. We think that what is intended by the use of the
term "system" or "general system" of work means simply this:
That the work, as it is commenced on the ground, is such
that, if continued, will lead to a discovery and development
of the veins or ore bodies that are supposed to be in the
claims, or, if these are known, that the work will facilitate
the extraction of the ores and mineral.
In Love v. Mt. Oddie United Mines Co., 43 Nev. 61, 184 Pac.
921 (1919) the assessment work for eight claims was done on a
shaft on one claim.

There was conflicting evidence as to whether

or not the work benefitted the entire group.

The jury and trial

court rendered a verdict and judgment for the relocator.

The

trial court gave an instruction to the jury "that where work is
done upon one claim for the benefit of the entire group, it 'must
manifestly tend' to the development of all the claims in the
group."

The Supreme Court of Nevada held that this instruction

was in error, that there was not evidence to sustain the judgment,
and reversed the trial court.
The following excerpts from the court's opinion are helpful
here, to-wit:
The trial judge, in his written decision, cited Section
630 of Lindley on Mines in support of his views. He no
doubt accepted the statement of Mr. Lindley without having
examined the authorities cited by that eminent author in
support of the text, as was most natural, in view of the
arduous labors incident to his position; and, while we
entertain great deference for the views of Mr. Lindley,
we cannot accept his statement of the law. Ne have examined the decisions of the various courts cited and do
not find that they support the author; nor do we see how
such a view can be sustained.
The word "manifest" means
"evident to the senses; evident to the mind; obvious to
the mind." Webster's Int. Diet.
The courts uniformly
hold that annual labor may be done outside of a claim,
or group of claims, upon a patented mining claim, or upon
the public domain.
Certainly work done outside of a
claim, upon a patented mining claim, or upon the public
domain, cannot be said to "manifestly" tend to develop
such claims; but it is the universal rule that proof may
be offered to show that such work was done for the purpose
of bydeveloping
suchFunding
other
claims,
that
in andfact
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"must manifestly" tend to develop a group of claims, work
done on the public domain could not count, as by no possible
stretch of the imagination, could it be said that such
work would "manifestly" tend to develop such group, nor
could proof cause it to "manifestly" so appear.
The correct
rule to apply to the situation here presented is declared
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Smelting Co.
v. Kemp, 104 U.S. 636, 26 L. Ed. 875 •.••
It may be said that it is the policy of the law to encourage
the doing of annual labor on mining claims in a manner
which will best develop the property and lead to the discovery of mineral, and for that reason annual labor upon
a group of mining claims may be done all in one place,
the object of the government being to encourage such
development as is most likely to result in the production
of the precious minerals; and since depth is usually
necessary in the making of a mine, it is much better, as
a general rule, to spend $800 in one place than to distribute $800 in eight or more places, provided it is done
in an honest effort to make a mine, and in a manner tending
to develop all of the claims. And in the exercise of judgment as to where work should be done, we think a wide latitud
should be allowed the owners of property, consisting of
several claims, as to where the work shall be done to
develop a group of claims.
And in this view we are sustained by ample authority.
In Big Three M & M Co. v.
Hamilton, supra, (157 Cal. 130, 107 Pac. 304, 137 lun. St.
Rep. 118 (1909)), it was said:
"Work done on one of a group of mining claims which
has a tendency to develop or benefit all of the claims in
said group inures to the benefit of each and all of said
claims, even though the system adopted may not be the
best that could have been devised under the circumstances."
Judge Farrington, in Wailes v. Davies (C.C.) 158 Fed. 667,
in determining a case in which the question before us was
involved said:
"The statute does not require
be wisely and judiciously done."

* * *

that the work shall

Miehlich v. Tintic Standard Mining Co., 60 Utah 569, 211
Pac. 686

(1922), with some similarities to Love v. !1t. Oddie

United Mines Co., supra, was a logical extension of Nevada Explor·
ation and Mining Co. v. Spriggs, supra, and further clarified
what this Court said in the earlier cases.
claims were involved.

A large number of

There were two factors in this case which
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conflicting evidence as to whether the work in question tended to
develop the distant claim.

Second, the trial court found that

the work did not develop the distant (2,000 feet) claim (Greyhound No. 5).

Now this Court had to decide what it meant in

Nevada Exploration in saying that it would not substitute its
judgment for that of the miner.
The Court confirmed the language in Nevada Exploration and
extended it to its logical conclusion by reversing the trial
court on the grounds that the Court would not substitute its
judgment for that of the miner, since there was evidence in the
record to support the contention that the work did tend to develop
the distant claim, even though sharply disputed by other evidence
and even though the trial court chose to believe the contrary
evidence.
The following excerpts from the opinion of the Court are
particularly pertinent here, to-wit:
As opposed to the defendant's testimony bearing upon the
question whether the work done tended to develop the Greyhound No. 5 is the testimony of the expert witness R. H.
Strickland, who gave it as his opinion that it did not
tend to develop the Greyhound No. 5. He gave it as his
opinion that there was some faulting between where ores
had actually been found in the workings of the Standard
Mine and the Greyhound No. 5, and geological conditions
generally showed that the work done on the group did not
support the defendant's contention that the work done
tended to develop the Greyhound No. 5.
In the light of
what has been actually demonstrated in the extensive
mine workings on the defendant's group of claims, it
would seem the opinions of expert geologists ought not
be particularly persuasive in arriving at the fact to be
determined.
The evidence shows and the trial court found,
that during some years since the location of the Greyhound
No. 5 the drifts projected from the shafts on the defendant's
group of claims were in a northwesterly direction, and away
from the Greyhound No. 5.
The trial court in making that
finding or arriving at that conclusion seems to have lost
sight of the fact that during those years the work, nevertheless,
was
actually
done forupon
within
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that the most economical and practical way to develop their
mineral resources was the sinking of shafts to attain depth
and then run drifts in any direction in which there would
be a likelihood of finding ore, not necessarily in the
direction of every claim composing the group, but in any
way that experience and good judgment of a practical miner
would dictate in order to intercept ore veins or ore
channels and attain a knowledge of underground conditions,
and where deposits of ore are likely to be found.
The mere
fact that drifts are not projected from a shaft toward a
particular claim some one year is no indication that ore
channels, when found in some other claim, will not in course
of time be followed or that they will not lead into that
claim. The very purpose of the government in granting
mineral rights to the citizen is to have the mineral resources of the country developed.
The ·statutes do not
attempt to prescribe the manner in which work shall be
done upon a mining claim in order to protect theminer's
rights.
If the labor tends to develop the mineral resources of the claim, that satisfies the law. Horeover,
the courts will never substitute their judgment for that
of the practical miner acting in good faith while expending
his money and labor for the development of a group of
mining claims as has the trial court in this instance.
Thus, the law in Utah has developed so that the test is one
of good faith, and the work is sufficient if there is competent
evidence of benefit, even though an expert witness may appear at
trial and express his opinion that the work was not of any benefit to a particular claim or group of claims in the group.
is also the rule in other jurisdictions.

This

See for example, Great

Eastern Mines, Inc. v. Hetals Corp., 86 N.M. 717, 527 P.2d 112
(1974).
Appellants do not specifically challenge the good faith of
Respondent and its predecessors in connection with the assessment
work in question except with an oblique reference to the effect
of inflation and the energy crisis on the assessment work requirement.

(Appellants' Brief, page 17).

Appellants, admit that

the required amounts (and much more) of work were done.

(Appel-

lants' Brief, pages 26, 30, 46; this Brief, pages 7-9, 24, 25).
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successfully questioned.

ATLAS CLAIMS have been consolidated

into one group or unit for purposes of exploring, developing,
working and operating the same and doing the assessment work
thereon extending back as far as 1945, when the first of ATLAS
CLAIMS were located--a period in excess of thirty years.

The

entire record in this case and particularly the work done as
shown by Defendant's Exhibits 71, 94, 95 and 96 show that a
tremendous amount of work has been done over wide-spread areas of
this property and that there was "bona fide intention to develop
the land and use the mineral resources" so as to meet the definition of good faith in Chamber lain v. Han tgomery, 1 Utah 2d 31,
261 P.2d 942 (1953).

Mr. Dearth testified that ATLAS has invested

much money in the area.
72.)

(Transcript of March 23, 1978, pages 71,

Extensive mining and drilling operations have been conducted

by ATLAS on ATLAS CLAIMS

(Exhibits 59-68, 71, 73-75, 80, 92-93).

That the "good faith" test was used by this Court in its
subsequent decisions is indicated by Utah Standard Mining Co. v.
Tintic Indian Chief Mining and Milling Co., 73 Utah 456, 274 Pac.
950 (1929),

in which defendant's 22 claims were located prior to

plaintiff's ten claims.

At least $930.00 in assessment work

(consisting of the extension of a tunnel on one claim and building
a road to the group of claims) was done during the critical
assessment year on defendant's claims.

The trial court found

that the assessment work had not been done.

This Court reversed

and remanded for a new trial on the grounds that "the defendant
Performed enough work to do the annual labor on nine claims out
of the 13 involved in the conflict area."

It seems clear that
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In New Mercur Mining Co. v. South Mercur Mining Co., supra,
discussed on pages 21, 22 and 33 of Appellants' Brief, plaintiff
owned 12 claims leased to Snyder Mines Inc. for which the assessment work in question was done by "leasers" under Snyder in a
tunnel on adjoining property owned by another party and also
leased by Snyder.

The trial court held the assessment work was

sufficient and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed.

The Court ex-

pressly followed the principles laid down in Chambers v. Harrington, supra; Klopenstine v. Hays, supra; \'Tilson v. Triumph Consolidated Mining Co., supra; Nevada Exploration and Mining Co. v.
Spriggs, supra; and Fissure Co. v. Old Susan Co., supra.
Because the work was done, not on one contiguous group of
claims as in the case at hand, but on another group of claims in
which the owner of the contested claims had no interest, the
issue with which this Court was most concerned in New Mercur was
the question of the "community of interest."

The Court was

endeavoring to set some standards as to when work done on one
group of claims with one ownership woula qualify as assessment
work on another group of claims with different ownership.

The

statements in the opinion about "burden of proof", "plans",
"systems" and "intent" must be viewed in that light.

That this

is a valid distinction is suggested in Simmons v. Muir, 75 Wyo.
44, 291 P. 2d 810 (1955).
Although the facts of New Mercur are distinguishable from
this case, a careful reading of the opinion, with particular
attention to the evidence from which the Court found a "system",
"plan", and "intent", and the Court's approval of the rules in
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position.
Appellants, on page 24 of their Brief, state their version
of the law as follows:
... (T)he burden is on the owner to clearly show that the
work in question, pr~or to ~ts performance, was intended,
under a general plan or scheme, as the assessment work
upon each claim and that the work manifestly tended to
benefit each of the claims.
The foregoing is not an accurate statement of the law in Utah
under the cases discussed on pages 27-38 of this Brief. ·
Respondent is unable to find any authority in Appellants'
Brief for the proposition that the owner has the burden to "clearly
show" that the work meets the requirements.

The Utah cases do

not contain this language, but rather uphold testimony which
"tends to show", and also hold that the Court will not substitute
its judgment for that of the miner acting in good faith and that
it will indulge in every reasonable presumption in favor of
upholding the validity of the work.

Wilson v. Triumph Consoli-

dated Mining Co., supra; Fissure Co. v. Old Susan Co., supra;
Nevada Exploration and Mining Co. v. Spriggs, supra; Miehlich v.
Tin tic Standard Mining Co. , supra.
supra.

See also Simmons v. Muir,

This latter approach was most recently demonstrated by

this Court in Albrecht v. Uranium Services, Inc., Case No. 15996,
596 P. 2d 1025 (1979).

Further, the requirement of a "prior general plan or scheme"
'1/as expressly rejected in Nevada Exploration and Mining Co. v.
Spriggs, supra, which holding was reaffirmed in New Mercur
~ing Co. v.

South Mercur Mining Co., supra.

Parker v. Belle Fourche Bentonite Products Company, 64 Wyo.
269, 189 Sponsored
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all the claims.

Simmons v. Muir, supra, shows the tendency of

the Wyoming Court to limit the holding of Parker.

In any event,

the Utah cases of Chambers v. Harrington, supra; Nevada Exploration and Mining Co. v. Spriggs, supra; Miehlich v. Tintic Standard
Mining Co., supra, and New Mercur Mining Co. v. South Mercur
Mining Co., supra, do not use the word "manifestly" but rather
hold that the test is whether the work "tends to develop."

The

use of the latter standard and the facts and holdings of the Utah
cases indicate that this Court, like the Nevada Court in Love v.
Mt. Oddie United Mines, supra, has rejected the language used in
Parker.
The work must be intended to benefit the entire group, but
this is shown here by the assessment affidavits in Exhibit 77
which state that the work done on ATLAS CLAIMS as a "contiguous
group

under common leasehold or ownership" was claimed as

assessment work and from the fact that the work actually benefitted all the claims.
The real issue is whether, under the standard used in the
Utah cases, there is sufficient evidence to sustain the finding
of the Trial Court that the work in question did benefit each of
ATLAS CLAIMS.
Appellants concede that for the assessment year ending
September 1, 1975, mining was done within 1,500 feet of Hihope
and 8 which were the only claims Appellants sought to relocate
(with Yellow Sand 13) for that period; that under their interpretation, "benefit" from mining extended 1,500 to 2,000 feet; but
contend that the mining was not headed toward the conflict area
andSponsored
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and Johnny Boy 1 in Mine No. 11 as shown on Exhibit 71.
page 9 of. this Brief).

(See

Appellants do not give any reference to

the transcript or exhibits in support of their contention that
the workings of the mine run in the opposite direction.

Even if

Appellants' assumption as to direction is correct, their contention
was made and expressly rejected in Miehlich v. Tintic Standard
Mining Co., supra.
~,

New Mercur Mining Co. v. South Mercur Mining

supra, did not involve that issue because the tunnel on the

property adjacent to the contiguous group in question was headed
toward the latter claims.
Appellants admit that Albert E. Dearth, whose qualifications
they do not question, testified that the work in question did
benefit the claims in question, but they attack that testimony on
several grounds.

(See Appellants Brief, pages 32, 43, 46, 45;

this Brief, pages 9-10).
Appellants complain that Mr. Dearth was an "interested
party" and emphasize the "independence" of their experts.
lants Brief, pages 32, 36, 44, 45).

(Appel-

This argument goes to the

credibility of the witness.

Appellants do not claim Mr. Dearth's

testimony was inadmissable.

Credibility was for the trier of the

facts to determine.

Cranford v. Gibbs, supra.

Judge Harding

might well have seen fit to accept the testimony of Mr. Dearth
because he had been involved in a direct way in a geologic
evaluation of the area where ATLAS CLAIMS are situated from
April, 1962 to the present, as against Appellants' witnesses, Mr.
Davis, who made only limited visits to the property and Mr.
~llion,

and

who had not had any contact with the area since 1956,
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area.

(Transcript of March 23, 1978, pages 69, 73, 144-146, 160-

162; Transcript of March 24, 1979, pages 6, 23, 25-27).

Judge

Harding might also have felt what was expressed by this Court in
Miehlich v. Tintic Standard Mining Co., supra, as set forth on
page 36 of this Brief, to the effect that in "the light of ..• extensive mine workings ••• the opinion of expert geologists ought
not to be particularly persuasive •.•• "

Further, Judge Harding

probably recognized that while there were differences among the
geologists who testified, the fundamental difference (as is
demonstrated on pages 44-48 of this Brief) was in the definition
given the word "benefit" rather than on the facts and the conclusions to be drawn from those facts.
Appellants complain because Mr. Dearth testified in "retrospect" and "after the fact" and did not tell of the "existence of
any type of prior plan, interest or scheme."
pages 32-34, 47).

{Appellants' Brief,

Mr. Dearth's testimony in this regard was very

much like that of Mr. Young and Mr. Marshall, the witnesses
relied upon by this Court to sustain the work in New Mercur
Mining Co. v. South Mercur Mining Co., supra.

The actual work in

New Mercur which was held to qualify as assessment work was done
by parties having no legal relationship to the owner of the
claims, who acted on their own initiative in following the ore in
the tunnel on adjacent property.

This Court expressly found that

there was no evidence to show that they did the work under any
direction from the owner of the claims or from any one having a
legal relationship with the owner, so that the specific work
could not have been done pursuant to a "prior plan" and the
testimony
about the value of the work in terms of the benefit to
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It has heretofore been demonstrated that Utah law does not
require a prior plan, scheme, or system, but rather that what is
required "is that the work, if continued will lead to a discovery
and development of the • • • ore bodies that are supposed to
exist in the claims."

Nevada Exploration and Mining Company v.

Spriggs, supra; this Brief, pages 32, 33.

Mr. Dearth's testimony

quoted on page 46 of this Brief, to the effect that the information
developed from the assessment work in question has been and will
be used to further explore and develop all of ATLAS CLAIMS, shows
that the work meets this requirement.
Further, the following testimony (which Appellants do not
attack) of Ray Kozusko, the geologist directly involved with the
CONOCO drilling in 1973 (for two of the critical assessment
periods), to-wit:

Q
(By Mr. Anderson)
After this project was
completed in October and November of 1973 in which you
were personally involved as you have indicated, did you
evaluate the results of that project, of that particular
drilling project, as well as all of the previous work
that had been done; or that is, the information on the
previous work (that) had (not) been done?
(Word "that"
should be added and word "not" deleted.)
A

Yes.

Q
And taking all of this information into consideration, would you describe to the court how the
drilling done in October and November of 1973 contributed
to a geologic evaluation of this entire group of claims;
that is, the claims that are involved in this lawsuit?
A
Can I round that out and add all the drilling
in there as well as my February and March drilling?
Q

Yes, if you would.

A
It will be one complete picture. Well, it
was designated in these gamma logs that we just looked
at.
Certain information can be gathered from the log
itself;
together
the
information
that
comes
Sponsored by and
the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.with
Funding for
digitization
provided by the Institute
of Museum
and Library Services
from the drill
cuttings,
as Act,
that
drill
hole
is drilled,
Library
Services and Technology
administered
by the Utah
State Library.
Machine-generated
OCR,
may
contain
errors.
one can correlate geologic characteristics fr9m the
'ld
drill cuttings back to this gamma log and beg1n to bu1

.......
Page 44
a physical picture in section or map view as to the
geologic environment in a given area.
In this case,
we're talking about this claim group.
(Witness indicating.)
Now, there are
various types of geologic environments which have been
attributed to the formation of uranium ore deposits;
and as one looks at all of this data, he begins to pull
it together and build a train of thought or a possible
model of genesis as it pertains to these ore deposits.
And by studying one particular area and seeing other
information from other sources around that particular
area, one can come in here and take the detailed information of the small area and apply it to the whole
region; and in this case, it was quite successful. And
that's basically it in a nutshell.
(Transcript of March 22, 1978, pages 37, 38).
shows that CONOCO had a plan and that it was successful.
Appellants assert that Mr. Dearth did not specifically state
how the work benefitted the entire group of claims and quote Mr.
Davis and Mr. Million at length to show that there was not any
benefit.

A careful study of the testimony of Mr. Davis and Mr.

Million shows that their opinions that the work done by ATLAS and
CONOCO did not benefit all ATLAS CLAIMS is based upon the assumption that in order for the work to be of "benefit" it must indicab
the presence of ore on all claims in the group.

That is, it was

their view that unless the drilling or mining on one claim is
sufficiently close to another claim that the "pod" of ore that
may be found on the first claim can be reasonably determined to
extend to that adjoining claim, there is no benefit.
Mr. Dearth, in the Transcript of March 23, 1978, at pages
69-72, in response to a question as to how the work benefitted
ATLAS CLAIMS and contributed to the development and/or extraction
of uranium ores therefrom, explained the geologic history of the
area
and then testified:
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has had the area under serious geologic evaluation since
early 1962.
Our exploration files contains hundreds of
dri~l holes whereby we can gather the geologic informat~on to demonstrate the trend of these sands
their
thickness, and other geologic criteria....
'
Now that we've established the streams and the
sediments that were deposited from the, in order to understand the geology and the deposition of the uranium deposits, we have to go to that period in geologic time
when the ore-bearing solutions were introduced to the
sandstones.
There is a technique whereby physicists can
take a specimen of ore and date the rock that contains
that specimen by radioactive decay.
That process has
established that most of the uranium deposits on the
Colorado p~ateau are approximately sixty million years
old.
When these ore-nearing solutions were introduced
to the sandstones -- and this sandstone is common(ly)
referred to as the host sandstone, because it houses
or forms a depository for the ore deposits -- the solutions
responded to chemical and physical conditions that allowed
the deposits to be formed in clusters that range from
1,000 tons up to 50,000 tons.
In addition to depositing
(precipitating) out as ore bodies, these solutions also
left evidence of having transgressed through the rocks.
This evidence is manifested in bleaching of the sandstone
from red to grey or green; decay of carbonaceous materials,
which was (were) the trees which grew along the streams;
color of the sandstone; and other geologic criteria that
we've been able to collect from underground observations
and drill holes.
Now, as we gather this information -- and I would
like to refer to the testimony of Mr. Black and the crossexamination by Hr. Frandsen when he asked detailed questions
about the information we gained from the drill holes -you will recall that Mr. Frandsen picked some logs that
showed ore grade material.
Naturally, we are pleased
when we drill a hole to find ore in it; and I would like
to also mention at this time the opportunity to explain
to Your Honor that these are the kinds of information that
we get from the drill holes which is an answer to a question
you asked several days ago.
Not only is the mineralization
recorded there, but the lithologic logs referred to during
their cross-examination contains the information about the
sand, which is helpful in making a judgment as to when
(where) the next hole should be drilled. Mr. Frandsen
pointed out that several of the drill logs contained no
ore and he correctly referred to them as dry holes, using
oil' terminology.
I would like to say that that piece
of information is important to the expiration (exploration)
geologist also, because it indicates to him that he
is off-trend· that he has chosen a location not compatible with' the depositional trend of the ore bodies.
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want my testimony to be recorded to say that all of
these criterion can be included throughout the district
to find additional ore deposits.
I would further state
that since 1962 the accumulation of data, geologic data,
that we have in our files has given me the confidence
to recommend to our management to sink the Snow shaft
which has been referred to in previous testimony as well
as (the) current . • • shaft we are sinking at a cost
of a million and a half dollars.
I'm confident that
these geologic guidelines that we gather from the assessment work that was performed in the years you have recited to me have been, can be, and will assist us in
finding ore deposits throughout this district.
The testimony of Mr. Dearth and Mr. Kozusko quoted above and
that summarized on pages 8-10 of this Brief, show how the work
done by CONOCO and Respondent during the critical periods did
tend to develop all the claims and was proper prospecting work;
that there are "trends" of ore across the property even though
commercial ore may not have been blocked out in every corner of
the property; and that a knowledge of these trends, which contributes significantly to further development, is enhanced by the
work done.

There is also much in the testimony of Mr. Davis and

Mr. Million not cited by Appellants which supports the above.
Mr. Davis testified of "general trends", indications from such
things as "sedimentation", "structure", and "structural geologic
stratigraphy"

(which "may give you a clue") and that there are

"stringers" which may lead from one ore deposit to another.
(Transcript of March 23, 1978, pages 141-159, 163.)

Mr. Million

acknowledged that there is a general trend or strike of ore
through the area, that the way the ore is deposited is uniform,
and that he would not recommend that the property be abandoned if
his described development program did not reveal the existence of
ore.

(Transcript of March 24, 1978, pages 27-29).
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dependent upon the finding of ore on a particular claim is
inconsistent with the Utah cases discussed above, none of which
require that in order for work on one claim to serve as work on
another it must show the existence of ore.

On the contrary, the

validity of the work was sustained even though it could not
possibly have served that purpose.

Nevada Exploration and

Mining Co. v. Spriggs, supra, and Miehlich v. Tintic Standard
Mining Co., supra, are the best examples of this.

There is

express language in Miehlich that attaining "a knowledge of
underground conditions" is a benefit, which supports the Respondent's interpretation of benefit.
Respondent submits that Appellants are confusing principles
dealing with a "calculation of ore reserves" with principles
dealing with assessment work where the standard is entirely
different.

It is also worthy of note that Appellants' complaint

that Mr. Dearth did not give specific facts to support his opinion
of benefit was raised by Justice Straup in his dissent and was
rejected by the majority of this Court in Nevada Exploration and
Mining Co. v. Spriggs, supra.
Appellants further complain because Mr. Dearth did not give
"limitations or guidelines regarding the area benefitted."
(Appellants' Brief, pages 32, 42, 43).

It is a sufficient answer

to this that Mr. Dearth testified as to ATLAS CLAIMS, the only
property involved in the case, and neither he nor the courts
involved need make any determination beyond that.
Respondent strongly disputes the characterization of the
testimony of Mr. Dearth that the drilling done was "a hit and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services

miss type of activity"
and
contends
that bythe
shows that
Library Services
and Technology
Act, administered
the Utahevidence
State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the work was done on a very systematic and scientific basis.

Page 48
(See the entire testimony of Raymond Sinkbeil, Ray Kozusko, James
D. Black and Albert C. Dearth in Transcript of March 21, 1978,
pages 141-147; Transcript of March 22, 1978, pages 2-42; Transcript
of Barch 23, 1978, pages 37-52; Transcript of March 24, 1978,
pages 36-39; Transcript of April 26, 1978, pages 75-77).
In Pinkerton v. Moore, 66 N.M. 11, 340 P.2d 844 (1959),
cited on page 22 of Appellants' Brief, the work which was rejected
by the court was reconnaissance surveys (probably done with a
geiger counter or similar instrument) which the court characterized as "geophysical" or geological" work.

The holding was

restricted in its application by the subsequent New Mexico case
of Great Eastern Mines, Inc. v. Metals Corp., supra.

Further,

since the instant case does not involve geophysical or geological
work, Pinkerton has no application here.
Parker v. Belle Fourche Bentonite Products Company, supra,
discussed on pages 22, 23 and 36 of Appellants' Brief, is distinguishable from the present case on two counts:

First, in that

case there was a finding of the trial court that the work did not
benefit the claims in question,

(See Simmons v. Muir, supra.)

and, second, that in the case at hand there are ore trends

throu~

the entire property about which the work in question gave information.

Even if Parker were not distinquishable, the decisions

of this Court, heretofore discussed, are to the contrary and deal
precisely with the issues here presented.
What has been said above is a sufficient answer to the
contention on page 47 of Appellants' Brief that Chambers v.
Harrington, supra, places the burden on Respondent to show that
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' chambers nor in any of the other Utah cases.
Finally, once again, the issue is one of fact.
Oddie Mines Co. , supra; Simmons v. !1uir, supra.

Love v. Mt.

The Trial Judge

found that the work did benefit each of ATLAS CLAIMS and that the
assessment work was done.

(This Brief, page 10).

Under the rule

of review in Rummell v. Bailey, supra, "taking all of the evidence and every inference and intendment fairly arising therefrom .•• in the light most favorable" to the findings of the Trial
Court, the evidence supports these findings.

As in Nevada Explor-

ation and Mining Co. v. Spriggs, supra, and New Mercur Mining Co.
v. South Mercur Mining Co. supra, the findings are "not clearly

against the preponderance of the evidence" and should not be
disturbed.
SUMMARY
The issues before the Court are essentially factual.

The

Trial Judge determined all the issues in favor of Respondent and
against Appellants and decided that:
I.

ATLAS CLAIMS are valid, that they have not been moved

and their location on the ground and dimensions are as shown on
Exhibits 41, 42 and 43.
II.

At the time HIHOPE CLAIMS (part of ATLAS CLAIMS) were

located in February, 1961, the land covered by those claims was
open to location and DESERT RAT CLAIMS and SAND VALLEY CLAIMS
were:
A.

Not validly located; and

B.

If they were, the annual assessment work was not

done for the critical periods so that those claims were subject
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III.

The assessment work was done on ATLAS CLAIMS for the
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periods critical to POWELL CLAIMS so that the land covered by
POWEI,L CLAIMS was not open to location when POWELL CLAIMS were
located.
Under the applicable law the evidence supports the decision
of the Trial Court in favor of Respondent and the same should be
affirmed.
DATED this

~

day of September, 1979.
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L. Robert Anderson
Attorney for Respondent
P. 0. Box 275
Monticello, Utah 84535
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